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Contract disputes between the Department of Defense (DoD) and its contractors are steadily
rising. This growth in Government contract litigation is fueled in large part by the myriad of
procurement regulations and laws that now permeate the acquisition and contracting arena.
This thesis first explores previous Government attempts to arrest the proliferation of litigation
through the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, and then discusses initial attempts at utilizing alternative
disputes resolution (ADR) methods as alternatives to traditional courtroom battles.
One such ADR methodology is the minitrial, which has been used successfully by private
industry since the early 1980's. Details of a "typical" minitrial are provided, including its advantages
and disadvantages. Additionally, criteria are established to assist in determining whether a minitrial
would be beneficial in resolving disputes between the DoD and one of its defense contractors.
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Abraham Lincoln, one of America's greatest Presidents and
lawyers, once said:
Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to
compromise whenever you can. Point out to them how the
nominal winner is often a real loser- -in fees, expenses,
and waste of time. As a peacemaker, the lawyer has a
superior opportunity of being a good man. . . .Never stir up
litigation. A worse man can scarcely be found than one
who does this. [Ref. 14 :p. 113]
A. BACKGROUND
Contract disputes between the Department of Defense (DoD)
and its contractors are presently being settled, with a few
exceptions, using the procedures outlined in the Contract
Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA) . This law permits DoD contractors,
who have a dispute, to utilize either the Armed Services Board
of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) or the U.S. Claims Court. The
Government's methods for resolving contract disputes are
incorporated into both the Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR) and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement (DFARS)
.
Government contracting officers and contractors have had
both difficulty and disagreement with some aspects of the
CDA's procedures. The adversarial tone of the legal
formalities, in many cases, ends up becoming a self-fulfilling
prophecy, when solid business relationships are destroyed over
legal and technical jargon. These disputes should not have to
become a win- lose situation, where one "side" is completely
"right." Additionally, the CDA process is very time-consuming
and in many cases, the cost of settling claims may be higher
than the value of the claim itself.
Within the private sector, some of the largest and most
respected corporations have utilized other dispute resolution
methods as alternatives to the traditional courtroom battles.
Companies have shown a willingness to forfeit some legal
safeguards in order to gain an expedient solution that
maintains a worthwhile business relationship.
These alternatives have become known collectively as ADR
(Alternative Disputes Resolution) . There are three primary
ADR mechanisms; arbitration, mediation, and negotiation, and
numerous variations and combinations. One such hybrid is
known as the minitrial, which has slowly emerged as one of the
leading ADR choices among the defense industry. With the
number of disputes being taken before either the Boards of
Contract Appeals or the United States Claims Court steadily
rising, the DoD has begun to pursue other methods in resolving
them. Unfortunately, there has not been much guidance, to
either contracting officers or defense contractors, as to how
to utilize ADR methods, specifically, the minitrial, in
resolving disputes.
This thesis will analyze under what conditions, and for
what benefit, the minitrial should be undertaken in resolving
a dispute between the DoD and one of its contractors
.
B. OBJECTIVES
This thesis has two principal objectives. They are:
1. Provide information about the minitrial explaining both
how it was developed and how it has been utilized in the
past. This will also include specific details on the
makeup of a "typical" minitrial, including its advantages
and disadvantages
.
2. Establish the applicable criteria to be used in deciding
whether a minitrial would be beneficial in resolving




1. Primary Research question
Under what conditions, and for what benefit, can ADR





a. What types of disputes are most adaptable to
minitrials?
b. To what extent is the minitrial being used in
contract dispute resolutions?
c. What have been the barriers to implementation of
the minitrial?
d. What are the cost and time savings associated
with' implementing, where applicable, the
minitrial?
D . SCOPE
The scope of this thesis is to provide background,
references, and recommendations so that DoD contracting
officials can make intelligent decisions as to when minitrials
could and should be utilized.
The areas focused upon included:
1. Background on the history and requirements of the CDA,





Basic definition of ADR and its three primary
mechanisms
.
3. Identification of the specific ADR method known as
minitrial . This method is defined and its process analyzed
and explained utilizing actual examples.
4 Development of criteria which provides a basis for
determining the applicability of using a minitrial in DoD
contract disputes.
The areas which were excluded included the following:
1. There was no in-depth analysis of other ADR
methodologies, including those hybrid models previously
used by the Department of Defense or other Federal
Agencies
.
2. There was no attempt to imply that every, or for that
matter any, contract dispute is identical. Every case is
unique, therefore, the contracting officials need to
utilize good sense and sound business judgment. (Of course,
some legal advice from the agency's legal department should
also come into play!)
3. There was no attempt to generate empirical data. Only
existing data and information were utilized for this
thesis
.
E. LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
This study is limited by its lack of empirical data
relating to DoD contract disputes, or for that matter, any
Federal Government Agency disputes . There are data and
evidence dealing with the successes of the minitrial when used
by the private sector, however, the actual examples of
Government use are minimal. Therefore, the recommendations
and conclusions were developed using primarily non- empirical
data.
Additionally, this thesis was written under the assumption
that the reader has a need for an ADR guide to the minitrial,
and its potential uses for DoD contract disputes.
Additionally, it is assumed that the reader has legal
expertise or has such expertise available.
F. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The literature search concentrated on information
available from private and public agencies that specialize in
ADR research and advocacy. Approximately 100 books, articles,
reports, and hearings were reviewed during the course of this
research. Of these, 35 were actually referenced. Almost all
of the research and data were provided by practitioners and
consultants in the ADR arena and included:
1. Law and textbooks on the different ADR methods.




Research papers and several studies done mostly by or
for Government agencies. These included the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers and the Department of Justice. Numerous
documents were obtained from the ADR source book published
by the Administrative Conference of the United States.
4. Training materials published by the Corps of Engineers
and several private contracting organizations.
5. Hearings on the use of ADR held by the Judiciary
Committee in the House of Representatives.
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter I presents the basic research questions,
methodology, scope, limitations, and assumptions of the study.
Chapter II summarizes the literature and focuses on the
Contract Disputes Act, alternative disputes resolution, and
the definition of a minitrial. The minitrial technique is
further broken down in Chapter III, with an in-depth
presentation of its advantages, along with specifics as to
when it would not be practical to utilize. Chapter IV is an
analysis of what conditions are necessary in order to produce
success and when a minitrial would be beneficial for the
Department of Defense. The final chapter presents conclusions




Statistically, civil and criminal Government contract
litigation has exploded from a specialty into an established
field of practice within the last fifteen years. For example,
in fiscal year 1990, the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals (ASBCA) docketed just over 2,000 new appeals, a 225
percent increase over new appeals docketed in fiscal year
1980. [Ref. 33 :p. 4] The United States Claims Court has
encountered a similar rise in the number of cases.
Additionally, the American Bar Association's Public Contract
Law Section reflects this expansion by an increase in
membership of over 50 percent in the latter part of the
1980' s. Coupled with the tremendous growth of the private bar
is an equally impressive growth in the Government sector.
The growth in Government contract litigation has been
fueled, in large part, by the myriad of procurement
regulations and laws. Changes in the procurement arena such
as the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) along with
corresponding changes in the Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR) and agency supplements have further added to the need
for additional attorneys. Also, the Defense Contract Audit
Agency (DCAA) has greatly expanded its ranks of auditors
responsible for ensuring compliance with the new procurement
laws and regulations, further complicating the equation. [Ref
.
3:p. 2]
Among the new laws that have increased Government contract
litigation is the creation of the position, Office of
Inspector General. This individual is tasked with the job of
ferreting out fraud, waste, and abuse, however manifested.
[Ref. 25 :p. 293] The net result is a completely new climate
in the Government contract field, highly adversarial, and very
litigious.
The relationship between the Government and the contractor
has deteriorated, in many cases, from one of partnership, to
one of adversaries. Even the Packard Commission concluded its
lengthy study by stating, "nothing merits greater concern than
the increasingly troubled relationship between the defense
industry and the Government." [Ref. 24:p. 9] Also, the
unprecedented peace-time increase in the defense budget during
the 1980' s, coupled with the cut -throat drawdown of the
1990' s, must be included as causative factors. Together,
these divergent forces have contributed to the tremendous
growth in Government contracts litigation, and the need for an
alternative method to resolve disputes.
B. CONTRACT DISPUTES ACT
When discussing the use of Alternative Disputes Resolution
(ADR) in the context of Government procurement, the Contract
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Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA) must first be explored. The CDA
created a uniform dispute resolution process applicable to
acquisition contracts entered into by executive agencies. The
term "executive agency" is defined as including wholly owned
Government corporations, of which there are thirteen. [Ref
.
34:p. 602(a)] The CDA process is mandatory, since the FAR
requires that a disputes clause incorporating the CDA
procedures be included in all agency acquisition contracts.
The CDA process is fairly straightforward. The CDA
requires that the contractor involved in a Government contract
dispute obtain a final decision from the contracting officer.
The contractor can then appeal to either (1) the appropriate
Board of Contract Appeals (BCA) or (2) the United States
Claims Court. Appeal from a decision of a BCA or the Claims
Court lies to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, but the United States can only appeal from the BCA if
the agency head so decides and the Attorney General approves
[Ref. 4:p. 67-69]
The first step in the CDA process is to attempt to
negotiate and settle the dispute. If negotiations fail, the
next step is to seek a final decision from the contracting
officer. For claims involving $50,000 or less, that decision
must be made within sixty days of when the claim was filed.
[Ref. 34:p. 605(c) (1)] In situations where the claim involved
is more than $50,000, the contracting officer need only decide
within a "reasonable time, " but must inform the contractor
within sixty days of receiving the claim how long that
reasonable period will be. [Ref. 34:p. 605(c)(2)] The
contracting officer's findings of fact are not binding in any
subsequent proceeding. The final decision must be in writing,
stating the reasons for the decision and informing the
contractor of his or her right to appeal. [Ref. 34 :p. 605(a)]
After receiving the contracting officer's final decision,
the contractor can appeal to the appropriate BCA within ninety
days. Appeals to the Claims Court must be made within one
year. [Ref. 34 :p. 606] Both forums have similar discovery
procedures and the same remedies. However, an important
advantage to appealing to the appropriate BCA is that, in the
case of claims of $50,000 or less, the CDA imposes deadlines
on the BCAs. For claims involving $10,000 or less, ("small
claims") the contractor may elect an expedited procedure that
requires a single Board member to issue a decision within 120
days whenever possible. [Ref. 34:p. 608(a)] There is no
judicial review available on a small claims decision. For
claims involving $50,000 or less, the contractor can elect an
accelerated procedure, in which appeals are to be resolved
within 180 days, whenever possible. [Ref. 34 :p. 607(f)]
Board of Contract Appeals members are appointed and serve
in the same manner as administrative law judges. Resolutions
of BCA disputes is to be "informal, expeditious, and
inexpensive." [Ref. 34:p. 607(b)(1)] Any appeal from the
BCA's decision to the Federal Circuit must be taken within 120
10
days of receipt of the BCA decision. Appeals to the Federal
Circuit from the' Claims Court must be brought within thirty
days. Findings of fact, but not law, are final and conclusive
if supported by substantial evidence. [Ref. 23 :p. 3]
Notwithstanding the Congressional objective of providing
an inexpensive alternative such as the BCAs for litigants to
pursue appeals, the highly judicialized rules of practice and
procedure used by most BCAs and the complex nature of many
Government contract claims has eroded this objective to the
point that appeals at the Boards often take as long, if not
longer, than many courts. [Ref. 18 :p. 54] For example, in
most appeals before the BCAs, the litigants are given
extensive discovery rights that include written
interrogatories, and oral dispositions. [Ref. 5:p. 96] The
documents found in discovery are then, in part, added to the
already existing appeal file or administrative record prepared
by the contracting officer by way of exhibits or supplements
to the appeal file. The only limitation placed upon discovery
is relevancy. The administrative record becomes even larger
during a hearing on the merits when testimony and exhibits are
admitted into evidence. Administrative judges have been known
to allow marginally relevant evidence into the record, despite
objections on grpunds such as hearsay, repetitiveness and
relevancy. [Ref. 5:p. 104] After an often voluminous record
is closed, the litigants prepare extensive and detailed post-
hearing briefs and reply briefs. The briefs are usually a
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lengthy discussion of the facts with extensive legal arguments
following. A decision by the Board may take up to a full year
or even longer in some instances, after the administrative
record closes. [Ref. 18 :p. 57]
Another factor to consider is that the ever- expanding
Government contracts bar has begun to use novel and
unconventional legal theories before the BCAs. These
approaches had not been previously used in the field of
Government contract law and their injection further impeded
the CDA's objective of a practical, informal, and expeditious
method of resolving disputes. [Ref. 9:p. 39]
Under the CDA, contractors and the contracting officer are
theoretically given wide latitude to negotiate a resolution
after a contractor has submitted a claim. There are some
restrictions imposed on a contracting officer's ability to
settle a claim, such as Agency approval, and oversight by the
General Accounting Office, the Office of Inspector General,
and Congress. [Ref. 29 :p. 44] However, at the claim stage,
these limitations are not as great of a constraint to
settlement because the contracting officer is still very much
in control of the claim. The only difficulty with settlement
at this stage is trying to overcome the contracting officer's
rationalization of an earlier decision.
Once an appeal has been filed with the BCA or Claims
Court, the parties tend to become entrenched in their
positions. Contracting officers are sometimes reluctant to
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settle a claim after an appeal is filed with a BCA because
accountability usually militates against settlements on any
ground except legal liability. [Ref. 19 :p. 30] According to
a spokesman at the Civil Division of the Department of
Justice, the Government cannot settle a case simply to save
litigation expenses. [Ref. 29 :p. 46] Moreover, agency
attorneys are now taking a more active role, further
sensitizing the contracting officer from overstepping his or
her authority or acting without superior's approval. Finally,
in actual practice, contracting officers tend to "hold out"
any settlement discussions until discovery is nearly
completed, because they know that the cost of discovery is a
strong incentive for the contractor to settle, while not such
an important factor for the Government.
The mere fact that an appeal has been filed often signals
a breakdown in the negotiation process, and the probable
hardening of positions of all parties. It is precisely at
this stage, before filing an appeal, where the greatest
flexibility and latitude for settlement exists. [Ref. 20 :p.
21] The parties have not yet incurred significant litigation
costs, nor have they escalated the dispute to their superiors
or actively sought legal assistance. However, the dispute has
"matured" to the extent that each party usually understands
the strengths and weaknesses of their own case. It is at this
point, not after the appeal has been filed, that ADR should
begin.
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C. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTES RESOLUTION
Alternative disputes resolution refers to a "broad range
of mechanisms and processes designed to assist parties in
resolving differences. These alternative mechanisms are not
intended to supplant court adjudication, but rather to
supplement it." [Ref. 31:p. 1] While use of these mechanisms
have grown, especially in the last ten years, Americans have
been resolving disputes privately for centuries. Historians
have traced the use of ADR as far back as the 1660 's when it
was utilized by the Puritans. During the 1880' s it was used
by many of the Christian Utopian communities. Also, during
the same period, Jewish immigrants from Europe had their own
tradition of resolving conflicts outside the established legal
system. "The Dutch in colonial Amsterdam, the Scandinavians
in the Midwest, and the Chinese on the West Coast, also
employed private ADR as a vehicle of ethnic solidarity. [Ref.
12:p. 18]"
Alternative disputes resolution provides an opportunity to
resolve conflicts creatively and effectively utilizing the
process that best handles a particular dispute. It is useful
for resolving many disputes that never get to court, provides
a means of settling 90 to 95 percent of the cases that are
filed in court, as well as preventing disputes from
developing. [Ref. 12 :p. 24]
Today's models for ADR were developed during World War II
where grievances arising under collective bargaining
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agreements were handled. These grievances were assisted by
the American Arbitration Association or the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service. [Ref. 31:p. 3] From these
circumstances and historical events, four goals of the
alternative movement emerged: (1) to relieve court congestion,
as well as undue cost and delay; (2) to enhance community
involvement in the dispute resolution process; (3) to
facilitate access to justice; and (4) to provide more
"effective" dispute resolution. [Ref. 31 :p. 4-5]
There are three primary ADR mechanisms and processes that
are utilized depending upon the type of complaint, the parties
involved, and the settlement desired. They are as follows:
1. Arbitration
This is a private, voluntary process where a neutral
third-party decision maker, usually with specialized subject
expertise, is selected by the disputants and renders a
decision that is binding. Arbitration can also be a
compulsory, non-binding process which must be done before
going to court. Each party has the opportunity to present its
proofs and arguments at the arbitration hearing which is less
formal than a court of law. [Ref. 7:p. 9] In compulsory, non-
binding arbitration (often called court - annexed arbitration)
if the parties accept the award as a judgment, the litigation
is terminated. If one of the parties rejects the award and
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demands a new trial, nominal sanctions may be imposed on the
requesting party'. [Ref. 7:p. 11]
2. Mediation
Normally this is a private, informal process where a
party- selected neutral assists disputants in reaching a
mutually acceptable agreement. In mediation, the primary
responsibility for the resolution of a dispute rests upon the
parties themselves. [Ref. 11 :p. 218] The mediator at all
times should recognize that the agreements reached in
negotiations are voluntarily made by the parties. It is the
mediator's responsibility to assist the disputants in reaching
a settlement. At no time will a mediator coerce a party into
agreement nor attempt to make a substantive decision for the
parties. [Ref. 11 :p. 234] A mediator must remain neutral and
impartial, free from bias or favoritism.
3 . Negotiation
Usually an informal, voluntary unstructured process used
by disputants to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. At
the option of the participants, the process may be kept
strictly private. There is no third-party facilitator,
although the parties may appoint individuals such as attorneys
to represent them in the negotiation, if desired. No limits
are placed on the presentation of evidence, arguments, or
interest. [Ref. 28:p. 17-19]
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These three processes, arbitration, mediation, and
negotiation are "often combined in various ways to produce
another set of ADR mechanisms. One such "creation" (and the
subject of this paper) is the minitrial
!
D. MINITRIAL DEFINED
The minitrial has been defined as a nonjudicial,
abbreviated presentation of each party's case to one
representative of each of the disputants. [Ref. l:p. 169]
These representatives, or principal participants, will attempt
to negotiate a resolution of the dispute both during and
immediately following the hearing. The principals are unique
in that they have been vested with sufficient authority to
unilaterally resolve the dispute at hand. By selecting their
own principals as the decision makers, the parties retain full
control over resolution of the dispute, instead of submitting
it to a third party (court or board) for decision. The
parties may elect to employ a "neutral advisor, " either a
legal or technical expert depending upon the requirements of
the particular case, to assist the principals in negotiating
a settlement. Typically, the minitrial consists of a short
hearing (not more than two or three days) and period of
negotiation (not more than fifteen days) following a brief
period of discovery. Ideally, the entire minitrial process
can take place in about ninety days following the execution of
the parties' agreement for minitrial. The agreement document
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is highly specific to the requirements of the subject
minitrial, and may require a planning period of some weeks to
properly draft. The planning period should not be neglected
or underemphasized, for the parties should form an agreement
that best reflects the needs of the case at hand, and
establish a hearing and decision making process which is both
expeditious and complete.
In summary, the minitrial is a private, consensual
proceeding where counsel for each party to a dispute makes a
shortened presentation of his or her case before the top
official with settlement authority for each side, and usually,
a neutral third-party advisor. Minitrials share the following
characteristics: [Ref. 16 :p. 45-47]
1. Parties negotiate a set of procedural ground rules (a
protocol) that will govern the non-binding minitrial.
2
.
Time for preparation is relatively short (between six
weeks and three months) and the amount of discovery is
relatively limited.
3. Hearings are usually no more than two days.
4. The case is presented to representatives of the parties
with authority to settle.
5. Immediately after the hearing, the representatives meet
privately to negotiate a settlement.
6. If a settlement cannot be reached, the neutral advisor
may render an advisory opinion on how he or she thinks a
judge would rule if the case were to go to court.
7. The proceedings can be confidential.
Appendix A is an example minitrial agreement published by




This chapter first discussed the tremendous growth in
Government contract litigation during the past decade. It
then provided background on the Contract Disputes Act of 1978:
both its history and its methodology. Alternative Disputes
Resolution was then explored via a definition and examples
.
Those examples were arbitration, mediation, and negotiation.
From these three primary methods, a hybrid method of resolving
disputes was introduced. That method, the minitrial, was
defined and its seven distinct characteristics were provided.
Chapter III will provide extensive literature review as to




Minitrials are no longer a novelty or aberration. To the
contrary, among those who have used the minitrial to settle
disputes are some of America's most respected corporations.
The list includes Allied Corporation, Amoco, Austin
Industries, Continental Can, Control Data Corporation,
Gillette Company, Shell Oil Company, Union Carbide
Corporation, and Wisconsin Electric Power Company. Moreover,
the types of disputes settled through the minitrial process
are varied; they include contracts, antitrust, product
liability, insurance claims, construction, trade secrets, and
employee disputes. [Ref. 32 :p. 89] The minitrial has proved
its worth not simply as a theoretical technique, but as a
practical device of widespread, including Department of
Defense, utility.
The minitrial has seven distinct advantages over
conventual litigation when it comes to resolving business
disputes. Those advantages, with specific business examples,
follow and also include appropriate applicability to




There is no statistical repository for legal expenditures,
either in conventional litigation, or in the ADR arena.
However, there are numerous examples where the cited savings
in legal expenses are in the tens of thousands of dollars.
Austin Industries, Inc., a large Dallas-based construction
company, has used the minitrial to settle rancorous
construction disputes at a savings of some 97 percent of
normal litigation costs. [Ref. 20 :p. 23] Unlike most
minitrials, the Austin minitrials gave a two week breather
between presentations of each case. The neutral advisor was
then required to issue a report on what he thought the outcome
would be if the case were to go to court. The parties settled
on the advisor's term within about two months. J. David
McClung, Austin's general counsel, states that his rule of
thumb is that anyone who litigates loses. [Ref. 20 :p. 24] For
that reason, he has often proposed minitrials in the midst of
a dispute, and in fact "just the suggestion has several times
facilitated settlements." [Ref. 20 :p. 25]
The major component of savings in minitrials lies in the
drastic reduction of hours that would otherwise have been
expended on pretrial discovery and on the trial itself. The
pretrial itself, since it involves the collection of so much
peripheral information, can last for years. Costs associated
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with it include hourly billings of lawyers and staff, travel,
and duplicating services. The trial can last for days, weeks,
and in most complex cases, for months. The trial time of
lawyers is always billed at top dollar, and if the court is
away from the lawyers' principal offices, travel and hotel
costs are likely to be considerable. Even when the trial is
over, costs can continue to climb precipitately. This is
because most sizable business disputes, and many smaller ones,
are later appealed; a whole new undertaking that can itself
take several years. [Ref. 30 :p. 214]
By contrast, the lengthiest minitrial will consume only
several weeks of lawyers' time, virtually all of it spent on
tasks that would have had to be undertaken anyway if the case
had gone to trial. Moreover, because the preparation process
forces the lawyers to narrow the issues and sharpen the focus
of the dispute, it may actually save money in the event that
the minitrial proves unsuccessful. This is due to the fact
that the lawyers will be able to prepare more efficiently for
trial. [Ref. 21:p. 79-80]
The American Can Company -Wisconsin Electric Power Company
minitrial is an example of how the preparation process
provides direct focus for a case. American Can sued Wisconsin
Electric for $41 million for breach of contract over the use
of industrial waste it was selling to Wisconsin Electric as
boiler fuel. Wisconsin Electric counter sued for $20 million,
claiming that its costs in burning the wastes were $20 million
22
more than it was contractually obligated to pay. [Ref. 15 :p.
114] The technical issues were numerous and intricate. It
was estimated that the trial would take at least seventy- five
days in court. Seven months into the discovery, the parties
decided to attempt to settle through a minitrial, and signed
on as their neutral advisor former Federal district Judge
Harold R. Tyler, Jr. [Ref. 15 :p. 115]
Before the three -day hearing, the lawyers supplied Judge
Tyler and the business representatives with several hundred
exhibits and brief summaries (fewer than thirty pages for each
side) of the parties' arguments and positions. As Robert H.
Gorske, vice-president and general counsel of Wisconsin
Electric, later stated, the abbreviated hearing forced the
parties to focus in a way that rarely happens in court:
Although the basic case and the counterclaim were
both extremely complex, the neutral advisor and his fellow
panel members had by the end of the oral argument period
on the third day, a complete grasp of what the significant
points of the two sides were. Further, all those present
had a better understanding of the arguments of each side
and how convincing they were. This kind of result is
extremely difficult (but not impossible) to achieve in the
usual procedure in which the trial counsel reports to his
client management about such matters. [Ref. 15 :p. 116]
Over the next several days, the parties met alone and with
Judge Tyler, who candidly evaluated the various arguments and
said what he thought the chances of ultimate success in court
would be. In three months, the case was settled through
private negotiations between the company representatives,
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eliminating the seventy- five trial days and many months of
protracted discovery.
The only costs in these proceedings that would not be
borne at trial are the immediate costs of the information
exchange and the neutral advisor. [Ref. 13 :p. 29] Since the
information exchange portion of the minitrial lasts two or
three days, the time involved is minuscule. The neutral
advisor is paid either an hourly fee (which could be as high
as $350 or $400 or more for top- flight professionals) , or a
negotiated flat fee, which might go as high as several
thousand dollars. [Ref. 30 :p. 252] Against the total cost of
the case, this fee is relatively inexpensive, and it is
usually divided equally among the parties. Moreover, in many
trials, expert witnesses will command similar fees (both for
testifying at trial and for helping the parties prepare for
trial) , and these fees are often avoided altogether if the
minitrial is successful.
Using a best -guess estimate, the minitrial of a complex
business dispute may result in a nonrecoverable cost to the
business and the Government of between $10,000 and $20,000.
The disputants will not be able to recoup this money if the
minitrial fails and they eventually wind up in court. But
against the costs that would be incurred without ADR, this is
a tiny expense, well worth the risk. [Ref. 16 :p. 49]
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2 . Preserves Business Relationships
Minitrials have invariably preserved important working
relationships, relationships that are typically lost in the
acrimony of litigation. This preservation has often been
cited as the most important result of successful minitrials.
[Ref . 35 :p. 2] This becomes even more of an important factor
when considering that many of the DoD contracts are with sole
source contractors. No one benefits if the relationship
crumbles as a result of litigation.
An example of a relationship that avoided permanent ill-
feelings was that of Control Data Corporation. [Ref. 17 :p. 42]
Contractors built the company's corporate headquarters in
Minneapolis with a fourteen- story glass wall that leaked
whenever it rained. Rather than immediately suing, Control
Data tried to talk the various participants in the fiasco into
repairing the flaw. However, two of the large contractors and
a host of other subcontractors declined to provide any remedy.
Finding no alternative, Control Data sued all of them for the
several million dollars it would take to make the repairs.
The problem was that everyone pointed a finger at everyone
else, and several fingers pointed back at Control Data, which
ironically does considerable construction work around the
world. At an early meeting with lawyers for several of the
parties, Control Data's general counsel suggested using some
form of minitrial. [Ref. 17 :p. 43] Rather than start up what
promised to be a round of massive discovery, the principal
25
parties- -Control Data, the architects, and the builders --
agreed to try the process to apportion liability among
themselves; they avoided involving the subcontractors at that
stage.
Each of the three groups appointed a senior manager with
full authority to settle the case. Each side had seventy- five
minutes to present its case and to question the others.
Initially, the parties' lawyers specified that neutral outside
engineers, architects, and a lawyer would sit with the
managers. However, the managers later decided to eliminate
these neutrals in an attempt towards simplicity.
Following the five-hour presentation, the managers met and
talked. After about ninety minutes, a settlement emerged. It
involved the payment to Control Data of several million
dollars and an arrangement that would permit the contractor
and the architect to replace the outside of the building piece
by piece, at their expense, over a three year period. The
solution was "eminently fair and practical," said Control
Data's general counsel, who noted that it was a more flexible
arrangement than a court would have been able to construct.
[Ref . 17 :p. 44] Following this agreement, the contractor and
the architect negotiated for about three months to secure
contributions from the subcontractors.
The net result of the process, Control Data's general
counsel concluded, was to preserve the business relationships.
"We will use these contractors and these architects again, " he
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said at the time of the settlement. [Ref. 17 :p. 43] "I can
guarantee you as the person who makes those decisions that if
we had gone to court with them, further business relationships
would have been very difficult to maintain. [Ref. 17:p. 45]"
Because they did resolve their differences, Control Data was
amenable to employing these same architects, contractors, and
builders in future projects. This is an example that the
Government should keep in mind as it wrestles with the
shrinking Defense Department industrial base. The number of
companies to "choose" from is dwindling; therefore maintaining
and nurturing the existing and successful business
relationships is critical.
3 . Allows Selection of a Knowledgeable and Neutral
Advisor
In Federal courts and many state courts, judges are
selected t;o preside over a particular case through a random
drawing. The judge's experience and knowledge do not enter
into the selection. A judge with no patent or antitrust
experience may find himself presiding over a complex patent
-
antitrust case as easily as a judge with prior experience.
[Ref. 10 :p. 670] The minitrial process permits the parties to
choose their own neutral advisor, one who is known to be well
equipped to deal with the technical, legal, scientific, and
other esoteric issues in the specific case.
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In a recent minitrial involving a major construction
company and a utility, the use of a respected engineer as
neutral advisor gave credibility to the decision for the power
utility, which might otherwise have balked at settling. [Ref
.
14 :p. 117] This advisor selection is especially crucial in
military contracts where the multitude of regulations make
even the simplest buy a complex procurement. The advisor
needs to be well -versed in the myriad of Government
acquisition and contracting policies. If not, the minitrial
is doomed to failure.
4. Enables Parties to Design Process
The minitrial enables the parties to design their own
process rules. This is a decided advantage over litigation,
whose formal rules of procedure and evidence can distort
issues and lead the litigants into a blind alley. [Ref. 2:p.
18] A set of rules tailored to the type of case and the
personalities of the key participants can make the proceeding
efficient, limit the time that needs to be spent at the
hearing, and relieve the frustration that comes from being
unable to put forward a coherent case all at one time.
5. Allows Creative Problem Solving
The minitrial greatly enhances the opportunity for a "win-
win" resolution of the dispute that is dividing the parties.
In courtroom litigation, the judge is bound to make a ruling
on the law that usually will give an "all or nothing" verdict
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to one side. There is precious little room for compromise,
because the judicial forum does not operate as a negotiator,
but as an adjudicator of legal rights: either the plaintiff
has a legal right to what it asks, or it does not. [Ref . 9:p.
128] Moreover, what is relevant in the courtroom are only
those facts and circumstances directly relating to the case at
issue. In a termination for default case, for example, judge
and jury will consider whether there was a legally binding
contract, whether it was breached, and what damages were
suffered. [Ref. 8:p. 84] They will not be interested in
whether the plaintiff and defendant are parties to other,
unrelated contracts. However, they should be interested
because when two organizations have ongoing relations, there
is almost always a way of bringing other aspects of the
relationship into the picture to effect a compromise, if they
try to do so outside of the courtroom.
A dramatic example of this extrajudicial compromise is the
Texaco-Borden minitrial . [Ref. 27 :p. 2] In May 1980, the
Borden Company filed a $200 million antitrust suit against
Texaco, Inc. in connection with a natural gas contract in
Louisiana. Both sides were initially confident of their
claims and defenses, and so the lawyers dug in their heels.
For example, Texaco lawyers expended many thousands of
billable hours, and the company produced some 300,000
documents during discovery. So complex was the case that the
Federal district judge scheduled a preliminary jury trial two
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and a half years later merely to "interpret the contract" in
the hope of limiting discovery. [Ref. 27 :p. 3]
A few weeks before the November 1982 trial date, Borden
counsel H. Blair White discussed with Texaco general counsel
William Weitzel, Jr. the possibility of a minitrial . They
established simple ground rules. The parties would meet on
neutral ground and argue the case before executive vice-
presidents of each company (James Kinnear of Texaco and Robert
Gutheil of Borden) . The lawyers would each have an hour to
present their cases, plus time for rebuttal, though, as White
put it, "no one was holding a stopwatch. [Ref. 27:p. 5] " Each
company was also permitted to have advisors other than
lawyers. Texaco had present a Louisiana operations manager,
and Borden had high-level operations and financial experts.
The hearing went smoothly, but the private discussions
over dinner between Kinnear and Gutheil did not. Gutheil
wound up pressing for even more money than White had demanded,
and Texaco' s Kinnear was so convinced of his position that he
"was reluctant to assign even nuisance value to Borden's
claim. [Ref. 27:p. 6]" In fact, Kinnear contemplated pressing
counterclaims against Borden.
At this point the outcome looked dim, but the parties did
not break off negotiations. They agreed to talk by telephone
in a few days, and these conversations led to still others.
Their persistence paid off: within a few weeks the dispute
was resolved in a manner never anticipated in the litigation.
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Indeed, it was settled in a manner that would never have been
possible had the dispute been taken to court.
The companies wound up renegotiating a gas supply contract
that had not even been at issue in the original case. They
also created a new arrangement for transporting Texaco gas to
Borden at prices favorable to Borden. This settlement
resulted in a "nine-digit benefit" to Borden that was
expected to give Texaco "positive earnings in cash flow,
"
according to Texaco associate general counsel Charles
Kazlauskas. [Ref. 27 :p. 9] The resulting contracts enabled
both Borden and Texaco to claim victory. "That is truly a
win-win situation, which we never expected, " Kazlauskas
stated. He noted that the parties learned five basic lessons
from the experience: [Ref. 27 :p. 10-12]
1. The litigation pending in the background provided a
strong incentive for settlement.
2
.
The mutually beneficial settlement could never have been
achieved in court, however, because courts lack the power
and expertise to fashion a complex remedy involving far
more than the simple payment of money. Lawyers acting
alone probably would not have been able to devise such a
settlement. "The magic was the creativity of two extremely
knowledgeable businessmen who recognized each others'
strengths and weaknesses. By repositioning these business
realities, they were able to make both sides winners."
3 The results could not have been produced without the
lawyers. Without their "persuasive presentations," the
executives would never have fully recognized the hazards of
litigation, such as the ambiguities of documents and other
evidence
.
4. The settlement dramatically changed the companies'
working environments . What had been a tense adversary
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environment was transformed into an attitude of
cooperation.
5. The settlement was achieved without the anticipated
immense expenditure of money and time, without the business
disruption that would have ensued had the trial gone
forward (and without the almost inevitable appeals and
potential retrials)
.
Kazlauskas concluded by stating: "I think the minitrial
alternative should always be considered when a potentially
complex business dispute arises, especially in inter- firm
disputes between Fortune 500 corporations. [Ref. 27:p. 13]"
By taking their differences to a minitrial, both companies
were able to bring into the picture their other contracts, and
to work out a deal that made economic sense to both. They
were able to expand their opportunities by considering their
entire business relationship. This relationship that is so
critical between commercial business entities is just as
critical as the relationship between the Department of Defense
and its contractors. The whole picture needs to be
considered, not just one blip. Therefore, before DOD "goes
after" a contractor, its future relationship with that
contractor needs to be addressed.
6. Maintains Confidentiality
Very few companies want to publicize an alleged mistake or
a dispute with an important business partner. Unfortunately
though, formal litigation that reaches the courtroom, takes
place in the proverbial fish bowl. The courtroom is open to
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the public, which for important business cases means an
inquiring press;' in a big enough case, it seems the whole
world will know the intimate facts. This is especially true
anytime Defense Department dollars are involved. The press
has a field day with cases involving "your tax dollars."
Also, disclosure of sensitive facts is not limited to what is
spoken in the courtroom itself; most documents produced in a
case and introduced in court are available for outside
inspection. [Ref . 14 :p. 120]
This is not the case with the minitrial. The parties can
operate under tight secrecy rules drawn up by themselves
.
Nothing needs to be disclosed before, during, or after a
successful minitrial. The proceeding itself is held in
secrecy: no outsider need be invited; indeed, no outsider
even needs to know that it is taking place. Documents remain
the property of the parties, who retain them when the hearing
is over. The neutral advisor is pledged to say nothing about
what he hears (and sometimes even to refrain from saying that
he served as a neutral advisor) , and he is barred from serving
either party as an expert witness or in any other capacity in
connection with the particular case. [Ref. 14 :p. 122]
This was the situation when two major oil companies used
a minitrial to settle a $28 million claim for cost overruns on
the construction of a supertanker. [Ref. 13 :p. 30] One of the
oil companies was buying a pair of Alaska oil trade tankers;
the other company owned the shipyard that was late in making
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them. Although the parties were barely on speaking terms,
they hesitated to go through a projected five years of
litigation, and they especially feared the attendant
publicity. So they presented their cases in six hours before
a three-member panel: the president of the shipyard, the
general counsel of the shipyard's parent company, and a vice-
president of the buyer. The settlement came about two weeks
after the six- hour hearing, and the customer got about half of
what it demanded. The parties stated that they were impressed
with the process, but they still would not disclose their
identities! [Ref. 13 :p. 32] This of course is a luxury they
would not have been permitted had they wound up in court.
This area of confidentiality is still up in the air when
it comes to Government contracts. There is still debate as to
whether the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) , or some portion
thereof, apples to any "judgment" involving tax dollars. No
settlements and/or results involving the DoD and a minitrial
have been challenged under the FOIA, however, that is not to
say that in the future, a settlement that was to remain
"closeted" will end up having to be publicized.
7 . Saves Time
A business executive speaking to the annual conference of
the judges of the Ninth Circuit Federal Court of Appeals
described justice as the right of a corporation to have its
"decade" in court. [Ref. 10 :p. 668] In a fast-moving business
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environment, dispute resolution measured in weeks and months
is far superior to litigation measured in years. The biggest
cost of litigation increasingly cited by business leaders is
lost business opportunities. The opportunities are lost
because of the shadow of litigation that makes executives
hesitant to act until it is settled. [Ref . l:p. 170]
Compared to formal litigation, the time preparing for the
minitrial is slight indeed. Most corporate lawsuits require
months of preparation at a minimum, and years when the case is
complicated. Protracted litigation can absorb an outsized
allocation of management's time just in peripheral discovery.
[Ref. 30:p. 118] A minitrial can be constructed and completed
in a matter of a few months; the hearing itself will last two
days, rather than weeks or months. In a minitrial, the time
required of key managers, even though they play the dominant
role, is quite limited.
C . DETERRENTS
In the early 1980s, many top corporate lawyers would meet
periodically to talk about alternative disputes resolution,
and the chief topic of conversation was the minitrial. [Ref.
10 :p. 669] They worried then as they do today: will their
suggestion to the CEO and top management that the company try
to resolve a dispute through ADR be greeted with skepticism?
Would they be viewed as soft-headed and weak? [Ref. 10 :p. 671]
John Stichnoth, general counsel of Union Carbide Corporation,
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and one of the earliest proponents of ADR, counseled many of
his brethren about jumping too fast because the "wrong case"
could ruin ADR's chances within a particular company if the
lawyers resorted to it under adverse circumstances and found
it wanting. [Ref . 12 :p. 43] Managers may permit themselves to
be talked into an experiment, but they will not be likely to
repeat a novelty if it goes wrong the first time.
With that in mind, there are times when the minitrial
could not, or should not, be a substitute for a lawsuit. The
following are those circumstances under which a minitrial
might not be an appropriate means of resolving a legal
dispute.
1. Unfamiliarity
Perhaps the single biggest deterrent to the use of the
minitrial is a lawyer's lack of familiarity with the process.
[Ref. 28 :p. 38] Although there has been considerable comment
on the minitrial within legal circles in the 1980s, only a
relatively small percentage of the practicing bar has any
knowledge of the minitrial and its success record. [Ref. 7:p.
8]
The lawyer's unfamiliarity is not inevitably a deterrent,
however, as the Gillette trade secrets minitrial demonstrates.
[Ref. 28 :p. 41] A Gillette employee quit his job to join
another company, allegedly taking with him trade secrets
involving writing instruments (otherwise known as pens!) that
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Gillette manufactured. The employee joined a competing
manufacturer, which quickly brought a similar product to
market. Gillette sued, claiming theft of trade secrets and
patent infringement.
From the very outset, Joseph Mullaney, Gillette's senior
vice-president and general counsel, sought a way to short-
circuit the litigation. A telephone call from Gillette's
divisional vice-president to the competitor's president (who
coincidentally had also once worked for Gillette) failed to
lead to a settlement. The competitor was prepared to file an
antitrust counter suit. When Mullaney suggested a minitrial,
his counterpart was quick to agree. The only dissenter was
Gillette's outside lawyer, who peppered Mullaney with
objections claiming that the minitrial could not possibly
work. [Ref. 28 :p. 44] Additionally, the outside lawyer
presented Mullaney with a lengthy memorandum denouncing the
minitrial protocol. "The memo was a classic statement of the
traditional position that only litigation would work,
"
Mullaney recalled. [Ref. 28 :p. 45] He firmly disagreed, put
his outside counsel on hold, and went forward.
The protocol provided for limited document discovery and
a tight timetable for examining the parties. The two
companies hoped to finish the case in four months, but the
schedule slipped a bit and it took six. In the end, after
listening to the lawyers' presentations, Gillette's divisional
vice-president and the competitor's president met for a
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morning with the lawyers and then, over lunch, reached
substantial agreement. The minitrial thus avoided virtually-
all the expenses of litigation and settled the case in perhaps
a sixth of the time that it might have taken in court.
The clear loser according to Mullaney, was Gillette's
outside lawyer. In opposing the minitrial idea, "he argued
that the courtroom was the only crucible for getting at the
truth." As Mullaney noted, "that's rather farfetched these
days. [Ref . 28 :p. 46] "
2. Tactical Use of Litigation
When one of the parties is using litigation as a tactic to
achieve some end other than simply winning a judgment (for
instance, to gain publicity for a particular cause) , the
mutual consent necessary to initiate a minitrial will be
lacking. Even so, the parties in many such lawsuits are also
seeking a reasonable outcome, and the smart litigator might
consider the possibility of gaining as much publicity value by
securing an appropriate settlement through a minitrial as
through a bitter court fight.
3. Deferment of Liability
It is no secret that defendants drag out many lawsuits in
order to defer payment for damages they caused. Under the
rules in most jurisdictions, no interest needs to be paid on
many damage awards until the moment the judgment is handed
down. [Ref. 25 :p. 295] (By contrast, proof of a claim that the
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defendant failed to make a required contractual payment will
result in an award for the amount owed plus interest dating
from the time the original amount was due. This is also the
case in DoD contracts. [Ref. 25:p. 296]) In many-
jurisdictions, court ordered interest is considerably lower
than real interest rates. So on both grounds, it will often
pay for a defendant to defer a finding of liability and
damages as long as possible. In such a case, the defendant is
unlikely to agree to resolve the dispute by minitrial.
4 . Trust
The minitrial requires some minimum level of trust among
the professionals, both the lawyers and the managers. If
feelings have reached a low ebb, mutual suspicions will be too
serious to allow one side to agree to the other's suggestion
that something other than conventional litigation be utilized.
The refusing party will doubt the efficacy of ADR and may
simply be unable to swallow a suggestion by an adversary that
they engage in a cooperative venture. One possible way to
break down the barriers of mutual suspicion is to have a
neutral intermediary, acceptable to everyone involved, explore
the possibility of structuring settlement talks. [Ref. 35 :p.
5]
5. Legal Rulings
When the principal issue in a case is a strictly legal
one, such as a violation of the Sherman Anti- trust Act, then
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conventional wisdom holds that such cases are better -eft to
the summary judgment procedures of the courts. [Ref. 5:p. 56]
This allows for the judge to simply hear the case and make
rulings based on law, and not submit the case to a jury for
findings. It is not necessarily true that these "pure law"
cases can never successfully be heard in a minitrial
procedure. The opinion of a neutral advisor who is a retired
judge or an expert in the particular field of law may tell the
parties much about whether it makes sense to continue the case
or to reach a compromise based on the advisor's opinion.
For example, when Honeywell and Telecredit engaged in a
dispute about the meaning of a contract provision involving
payment of a $100,000 license fee, the facts were undisputed.
The dispute turned on whether a particular clause in the
contract required Honeywell to make one payment or two before
exercising an option to cancel the deal. The amount in
dispute was too small to take to court, so the parties
designated an arbitrator to make a "legal" ruling on the
meaning of the contract clause. [Ref. 4:p. 71] The parties
resorted to an arbitrator because they wished the outcome to
be binding. Had they not, they could as easily have had their
managers listen to the debate in a minitrial format.
However, it certainly is true that there will be no
consent to a minitrial if one side is litigating because it
wants a court ruling in order to establish a new rule of law.
In certain types of cases, the plaintiff may be seeking a
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legal ruling or the reaffirmation of a policy. As an example,
a public interest plaintiff may be seeking a court ruling on
the meaning of an environmental statute [Ref . 26 :p. 7] , or the
Government may be seeking to vindicate its policy of filing
certain kinds of lawsuits. [Ref. 4:p. 75] When these elements
are present, the plaintiff may feel that its interests are not
served by a minitrial.
6. Witness Credibility
Wisdom holds that when a case revolves around the
credibility of key witnesses, it will be hard to resolve
through a minitrial. It has been suggested that credibility
issues are inherently incapable of being resolved in an
objective fashion; hence, the executives will be obliged to
sort out the facts (or fantasies) after the hearing is over.
[Ref. 11 :p. 86] How to deal with the facts as they exist is
something "with which experienced negotiators can cope. How to
determine the facts is not. It is always possible, of course,
to show that a witness is flat-out lying, but rarely is direct
evidence available. In most issues where credibility is key,
the witnesses may not be deliberately lying, but rather to be
stating their different (and sincerely felt) versions of the
truth. [Ref. 11 :p. 92] In a minitrial, this presents too




In some cases, plaintiffs seek what, to the defendant,
amounts to large or even crippling judgments. When the
plaintiff, or the plaintiff's lawyer, genuinely expects or at
least hopes for a giant verdict, or one that would cripple the
defendant, a minitrial may not work. This criterion is at
best only a very general one, and specific circumstances may
dictate the prudence of trying a minitrial anyway. The size
of damages is relative to the size of the company, its assets,
revenues, business prospects, and the risk that others will
bring similar claims. Moreover, the mere demand for large
damages does not prove a strong belief by the plaintiff in the
likelihood of recovering them, and the minitrial setting may
provide both sides an opportunity to see that the issues and
claims can be negotiated. [Ref. 16 :p. 49]
8. Need for a Jury
Some plaintiffs will want their cases heard by a jury in
the first instance, because they suppose that the particular
facts (such as the nature of the injury in a personal injury
case or that the big, bureaucratic DoD was insensitive to the
feelings of the "innocent" small contractor) may make their
claim especially compelling to a jury. [Ref. 19 :p. 38] Even
here though, it is possible to convince a plaintiff's lawyer
otherwise, if for example, there is concern about bankrolling
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a suit against a large company (or the Government) with
tremendous financial staying power.
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Chapter III provided the background on the minitrial,
including its advantages and disadvantages. The seven
advantages were that it saved money, preserved business
relationships, allowed selection of a neutral advisor, enabled
the parties to design the process, allowed for creative
problem solving, maintained confidentiality, and saved time.
On the other hand, the minitrial would not be advantageous
when the participants are unfamiliar with the minitrial
process, where tactical use of litigation is desired, where
deferment of liability is desired, where trust is an issue,
when legal rulings are desired, where witness credibility is
questioned, when large financial judgements are desired, and
when there is a need for a jury.
The next chapter will discuss possible minitrial
applications to the Department of Defense, and what conditions
are necessary for successful resolutions of disputes.
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IV. APPLICATION TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
A. OVERCOMING OBSTACLES
The growing movement in corporate and consumer disputes to
save time, money, and judicial resources through alternative
disputes resolution techniques, such as minitrials, has slowly
reached the Government setting. [Ref. 3:p. 2] Exploration of
this technique should be helpful since the Government has
experienced the same rising litigation costs and interminable
court delays as private parties. Several perceived statutory
and practical obstacles have impeded the Government in using
creative disputes resolutions, however, the minitrial might
be just the vehicle to overcome these obstacles.
The first obstacle which makes Government contract
disputes distinct from commercial litigation is the elaborate
disputes resolving statutory procedures mandated by the
Contract Disputes Act (CDA) of 1978. [Ref. 34 :p. 601-613] The
statute applies to all contracts entered into after March 1,
1979. A key provision of the statute mandates that all
Government contracts include disputes clauses which set forth
procedures by which disagreements relating to the contract
must be resolved. [Ref. 34:p. 607(d)] The procedure requires
the Government to make a final written decision concerning the
disagreement with the contractor, including all the facts and
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legal conclusions which led the Government to deny the
contractor's claim. Upon receipt of the Government's final
decision, the contractor has three options: (1) acquiesce;
(2) appeal the decision to an agency board of contract
appeals; or (3) sue in the U.S. Claims Court. [Ref. 34 :p.
609(a)
]
Whether these statutory procedures are exclusive is a
question which raises an impediment to the Government's use of
the minitrial technique. For example, in a recent case., the
Interior Board of Contract Appeals held that the Government
could not submit to binding arbitration because of conflict
with the statutory procedures. [Ref. 22 :p. 21] The
Government's authority to settle and to devise means of
settling, however, has never been doubted because in fact a
basic purpose of the Contract Disputes Act is to promote more
efficient resolutions of disputes.
A second serious obstacle facing Government use of
expedited settlement is "the natural inclination of agency
officials to follow the book, in resolving disputes, thereby
theoretically avoiding Congressional and public criticism.
[Ref. 23:p. 3]" A plethora of organizations outside the
agency review and second-guess any settlement. Potential
reviewers and possible critics include oversight committees of
Congress, audit teams from the General Accounting Office
(GAO) , and the agency inspectors general, as well as the
general public. The use of minitrials may actually ease this
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problem, however. The minitrial process requires a written
record clearly documenting the issues of settlement, potential
litigation risks are clearly described by the legal positions
set forth in the briefs, and the formality of the procedure
itself may lessen criticism.
A third perceived constraint unique to the Federal
contracts context is the question of settlement authority.
Federal agencies have a rigid chain of command (especially the
DoD). and settlements must often be approved by the legal,
financial, procurement policy, and technical divisions of an
agency. [Ref . 22 :p. 18] Tentative settlements are often upset
by subsequent internal agency review. The minitrial procedure
may also alleviate much of this problem. In preparation for
the minitrial, the Government is forced to define the
authority of the negotiation and the acceptable negotiating
position. The advance approval and "written authorization
from the head of the agency, empowering the representative on
behalf of the agency to reach a settlement, reduces the
opportunities for overturning the settlement. [Ref. 22 :p. 21] "
Finally, a related problem for the Government is the
question of settlement funding requirements. A negotiating
officer for the agency obviously cannot ultimately make
settlement without the funds to cover the amount . Minitrial
requirements in some ways relieve these problems by involving
senior officials who have the authority to approve "re-
allotments" . [Ref. 3:p. 17] Re-allotments can be made within
46
the agency to cover the financial needs of a particular
settlement
.
B. CONDITIONS NECESSARY TO PRODUCE SUCCESS
One of the virtues of the minitrial is that it can be
tailored to meet the requirements or needs of a specific
dispute. Nevertheless, a minitrial will most likely succeed
if certain procedures have been incorporated into the ground
rules drawn up by the parties involved. Those areas that
should be specifically addressed include the following: [Ref
.
17:p. 26-35]
1. Negotiate Ground Rules
Since minitrials are voluntary, the parties must agree not
only to conduct one, but to also provide for a set of ground
rules or common procedures, often known as the "protocol," to
guide the participants throughout the minitrial process. The
precise rules are less important than the process of arriving
at them. The key is to persuade those involved to accept the
process of letting key executives with authority to settle
listen to a highly abbreviated version of both sides of the
case, and of then agreeing on the procedures that would best
achieve the settlement goal.
The idea of a minitrial can be initiated via a lawyer,
through principals involved, or through a neutral
intermediary. How best to proceed depends on the stage of the
dispute and its circumstances; no rule of thumb is possible.
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If the dispute has not yet gone to lawyers, it is possible to
contact the adversary directly and suggest a settlement
utilizing a non-binding, focused procedure. If the case is in
litigation, then a lawyer on one side would raise the
possibility with the opposing attorney. Whatever the case, a
minitrial protocol should be established and should address at
least eleven concerns: [Ref. 17 :p. 28]
a . Issues
Although the non-binding status of the minitrial
means that one need not be concerned about rigidly enforcing
restrictions on certain issues, it makes sense to have at
least a general idea about which issues are to be discussed
and which issues are out of bounds.
Jb. Discovery
In the typical case, amount of allowable discovery
should be relatively limited. If the parties are in the midst




The protocol should obligate the parties to present





The names of the business and Government principals
to be present, the number of lawyers, experts, and other
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witnesses should be aired and agreed upon at this time. Most
importantly, the protocol should set forth the status of the




The ground rules should set forth the date, time,
and place of the minitrial . It should also provide a schedule
of events to include how much time will be allocated to the
parties' direct case, to rebuttal, to questions, and so forth.
f. Evidence
No formal rules of evidence are required, however,
if certain rules are to be followed (for example, no expert
testimony except from experts actually present at the
hearing) , these should so be stated formally in the protocol.
g. Documents
It may be necessary for the parties to exchange
briefs and other documents in advance of the minitrial
.
Again, these should be specified in the protocol, along with
the appropriate timetable for their submission.
h. Neutral Advisor
A decision must be agreed to on whether to use a
neutral advisor, and if so, how the selection will be made.
When selected, the neutral advisor's name should be




The protocol should provide for the confidentiality
of all documents exchanged and statements made, and for their
inadmissibility (and the inadmissibility of any opinion given
by the neutral advisor) in any future proceeding. The first
concern is to prevent the information divulged in the
proceedings from subsequent disclosure at a trial . The second
concern is to keep all news of the proceeding private, so that
the dispute is not aired publicly (in other words, so the
press does not find out)
!
jf . Costs
Agreement should be reached at the onset on how the
various costs of the witnesses, neutral advisor, and any
others should be apportioned. It is generally the rule that
the neutral advisor's fee is divided evenly between the
parties.
k. Pending Litigation
Finally a decision must be reached as to how any
currently pending litigation should be handled. Usually, the
parties agree to suspend discovery and to stay the litigation
until the minitrial is complete and they have had some period
of time to negotiate a settlement.
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2. Limit Preparation Time
One of the 'most important factors in the success of
minitrials thus far has been the limited amount of time that
the lawyers and others have been allowed for preparation.
Ordinarily, much of the time devoted to pretrial discovery in
formal litigation is relatively non- focused. [Ref . 30 :p. 218]
It is a cross between a fishing expedition (hoping to catch
particularly important documents) and a dredging of the lake
bed (searching for everything) . [Ref. 19 :p. 33] As lawyers go
about this task, they do not necessarily concentrate on which
documents and depositions are critical. However, when the
lawyers are suddenly faced with an extremely short period of
time, perhaps six to eight weeks, in which to prepare the case
as a whole, they and everyone else connected with the case
suddenly focus on the heart of the matter. This short period
is therefore crucial, because it forces everyone to do what
ideally they should have done from the outset. It eliminates
the inconsequential, puts the case in perspective, and short-
circuits the expensive routines the lawyers had been or would
be pursuing. [Ref. 30 :p. 243]
Preparation time must necessarily include briefing the key
executives who will be present for each party. No business or
Government representative should walk into the minitrial cold,
without understanding the basics of the case, the nature of





The minitrial itself should be confined to one or two
days. Brevity is the soul of the minitrial because it forces
concentration on what actually matters. [Ref. 22:p. 15] Also,
since the business and Government executives will be crucial
participants in the minitrial, it would be impractical to
expect them to devote an extended period to formal
presentations. Moreover, if the minitrial were allotted more
time, there would be a real risk that it would mimic the
litigation process and thus be prey to all rigidities of a
trial. The strengths of this process are its informality and
flexibility; strengths it gains from its brevity.
4. Present "Best" Case
Probably the two most important features of the minitrial
are that first, the case presented should be the "best" case
possible, no holds barred, no punches pulled; and second, that
the case be made before representatives who have full
authority to settle all aspects of the dispute. [Ref. 7:p. 9]
Without these elements the process, whatever else it might be,
could not be considered a minitrial and would not be likely to
succeed.
When first hearing about the minitrial process, there is
concern expressed that the lawyers will not in fact present
the best possible case. [Ref. 29 :p. 46] Lawyers do not like
to disclose their strategies to their adversaries, especially
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if, as is the case here, there is some risk that the
settlements will" fail and the case will then proceed to a
traditional trial. By presenting the best case, won't a
lawyer thus be giving away the store? And knowing this, won't
each lawyer be tempted to reserve at least some relevant bits
of information or arguments for an eventual trial?
Experience shows that in this arena the lawyers do not
hold back. [Ref . 29 :p. 47] The primary reason is that the two
representatives are not only present, but also key
participants in the process. The evidence is being shown to
the business executives; the arguments are being made to the
same executives. Ultimately, it is their decision that
counts, not that of some judge or independent jury.
The minitrial is a settlement process. Only by soaking
themselves in the facts and the law of the case, and by
balancing the two, can the parties themselves, through their
representatives, make an informed decision on whether to
settle and for how much. Many cases fail to settle when the
lawyers negotiate by themselves because neither they nor the
client appreciates the realities of the situation. [Ref. 12 :p.
186] Without a minitrial, settlement negotiations are often
uninformed. Following a minitrial, the parties can assess far
more accurately the probable results of a trial and take those
results into account in their settlement negotiations.
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5. Select Knowledgeable and Neutral Advisor
Not every minitrial utilizes the services of a neutral
advisor. There have been cases in which the parties met in
one of the lawyers' offices and presented the evidence and
hashed out the arguments. [Ref. 9:p. 68] However, in most
cases, the minitrial seems to work best if the parties jointly
choose a neutral adviser to moderate the proceedings if things
become too heated, to keep the players to the agreed upon
schedule, and to give an informed opinion on the likely
outcome of the case should the business representatives fail
to settle and the case goes on to trial. [Ref. 16 :p. 49]
Professor Eric Green of Boston University Law School (and
one of the originators of the minitrial) has identified seven
reasons for preferring a third-party neutral advisor.
[Ref. 17:p. 32-33]
a. Catalyst for Compromise
The neutral can help parties seek joint gains by
devising new compromises and helping to elaborate what appears
to be a single problem into an integrated negotiation with
several components over which the parties can bargain. This
enables the negotiators to search for and achieve a "win-win"
outcome, rather than a "you lose, I win" outcome. In a
minitrial, the business representatives' creativity is
catalyzed by the participation of the third-party neutral.
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b. Bridges the Gap
The neutral can bring the parties together during
the information exchange. In a minitrial, he or she often
bridges the gap between the disputing parties, cuts through
suspicion, and thus brings the players to the table.
c. Establishes Procedural Ambience
The third party can help establish the proper
procedural ambience for negotiation before, during, and after
the information exchange. The advisor helps to set the rules
in the dispute, can lead the discussion, and can set an
agenda. Sometimes the third party can smooth out
interpersonal conflict. If necessary, the third party can
prepare neutral minutes
.
d. Clarifies Values and Worth
The neutral can help parties clarify values and
derive reasonable prices. A third party with hands-on
litigation experience can help the parties analyze their cases
and advise them on a settlement outcome. This is especially
important when each party believes that it has a high
probability of succeeding at trial. The minitrial is ideal
for cases in which each side estimates that its chances of
success are 75 percent or higher.
e. Deflates Unreasonable Expectations
A neutral can deflate unreasonable claims and
loosen commitments. The minitrial minimizes excessive
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posturing and breaks down barriers and entrenched positions.
The third-party neutral allows people to see with a fresh,
unbiased perspective.
f. Facilitates Continuation of Negotiations
The neutral can keep negotiations going when they
threaten to break down by being an advocate for agreement
.
The neutral holds communication lines open and helps each side
save face
.
g. Promotes Acceptance of a Solution
Finally, the neutral can articulate the rationale
for agreement, thereby promoting acceptance of a satisfactory
solution.
These reasons will hold if the parties have done their
homework and selected an appropriate neutral advisor, a person
who is fartTiliar with the industry and the types of issues that
will be raised and the responses that will be made. Precisely
because the neutral advisor is knowledgeable, the parties will
trust his or her analysis of the probable outcome of the case
should it go to trial, thus giving them a far greater
incentive to reach agreement on their own. [Ref. 31 :p. 11]
6. Hold Settlement Talks Immediately
Once the minitrial has concluded, the representatives, who
have full authority to settle, should meet immediately to
discuss how settlement can be reached. "Immediately" means
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just that: as soon as the hearings have concluded, the
representatives should retire to a separate room and talk. In
a few instances, representatives have waited to hear comments
from the neutral advisor, or have permitted some time to go by
for the advisor to seek additional evidence. [Ref . 14 :p. 127]
However, the preferred course is to talk immediately, for the
simple reason that the entire case is fresh. In all
likelihood a spirit of goodwill has been engendered during the
course of the exchange and this can be enough to carry the
representatives through what could be difficult negotiations
and what certainly will be critical moments of the entire
process.
In most cases, the representatives negotiate privately,
that is, without their lawyers present. [Ref. 14 :p. 129] If
agreement is reached in principle, the lawyers will reenter
the picture because they will need to put the agreement in
writing. In virtually every case, the outcome of a minitrial
is a contract stating the rights and obligations of the
parties and explicitly providing for the termination of any
pending litigation. [Ref. 5:p. 223]
7 . Provide for Confidentiality
The final common element of minitrials is confidentiality.
The parties should agree in the protocol that the neutral
advisor's comments and written opinions, if any, will not be
offered as evidence or for any other purpose at a subsequent
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trial. The neutral advisor should be disqualified from acting
as an advisor, expert, or in any other capacity for either of
the parties at any subsequent hearings. [Ref. 2:p. 24] Any
documents, depositions, or statements made at the minitrial or
in connection with it, including briefs submitted beforehand
to the parties, should similarly be barred from use at any
trial. [Ref. 2:p. 26] Many agreements explicitly state that
even the fact that the minitrial took place is not to be
referred to in the event that the settlement discussions fail.
The protocol should not neglect the second element of
confidentiality in that the parties be spared any discussion
of the proceedings by the public at large (assuming, as most
do, that the parties wish to keep it secret) . Again, this can
be provided for easily enough in the protocol, which can bar
any of the parties, the lawyers, or the neutral advisor from
disclosing the existence of the agreement to conduct the
minitrial, and from discussing the matter before, during, or
after the minitrial hearing. [Ref. 21 :p. 80]
Although there still remain legal uncertainties about the
extent to which every facet of the minitrial can be kept
confidential (especially where Government contracts are
involved)
, much of it probably can be kept confidential. This
assurance will provide an atmosphere in which the parties can
confidently attempt to resolve the dispute quickly, cheaply,
and with a minimum of rancor.
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C. CATALYST FOR THE FUTURE
Despite the obstacles mentioned earlier, the Government
has already begun exploring ADR techniques, such as
minitrials, because of several factors relating to litigation.
The most obvious catalyst for exploration of alternative
resolution techniques is the rising cost of litigation and the
court delays which face all private parties, and with perhaps
even greater force, the Government. Disputes between the DoD
and its suppliers was the natural result of an increase in
federal procurement spending and likewise, the downsizing has
made DoD funds even more precious to defense contractors
.
Although the administrative appeals boards were designed as a
streamlined alternative to court litigation, the costs are
still substantial because of the formal procedures of the
boards. Minitrials, however, have resulted in substantial
savings for those parties that have utilized them. For
example, in the NASA/TRW case, which was the first minitrial
used in the context of Government procurement, it was
estimated that the savings "were probably more than $1 million
in legal fees alone. [Ref. 22:p. 26]"
Another factor making the minitrial particularly
attractive to the Government is related to the required
procedures of the Contract Disputes Act itself. The required
disputes clause in Government contracts requires that Federal
suppliers continue performance, notwithstanding a dispute with
the Government. The contractor may not stop work and
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immediately challenge in court an agency order or contract
interpretation. TRef. 8:p. 118] Another mandatory clause in
all Government contracts, the "Changes Clause", also allows
the Government to insist upon changes to the contract during
performance. [Ref. 8:p. 122] These allowable Government
changes would of course be considered breaches of contract in
a commercial setting. In exchange for these two conditional
clauses, the Government must pay a fair amount for additional
work. Problems arise, however, when the Government does not
consider one of its directions as being a "change" in the
contract. The contractor must continue to perform and leave
for later the question of who will bear additional costs. An
efficient, expedited resolution of the dispute by minitrial
settlement would therefore lessen the adversarial roles
between the Government and its supplier. .. "a phenomenon that
serves the ongoing business relationship of the parties to
Government contracts. [Ref. 22:p. 19]"
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter dealt with possible applications of the
minitrial to Department of Defense disputes. It first stated
the obstacles that must be overcome in utilizing the
minitrial, or for that matter, any form of alternative
disputes resolution. The conditions necessary to produce
success were then extensively detailed. They include
negotiating the ground rules up front, limiting preparation
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time, abbreviating the hearing, presenting "best" case,
selecting a knowledgeable and neutral advisor, and providing
for some sort of confidentiality. Finally, a recommendation
was provided pushing the use of minitrials as a catalyst for
resolving successfully disputes between the DoD and its
defense contractors.
The final chapter provides conclusions, recommendations
for minitrial use, and areas for further research.
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS SUMMARIZED
Former Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court,
Warren Burger, identified both the need and the potential
opportunities for all forms of alternative disputes
resolutions in the following words:
Our distant forebearers moved slowly from trial by
battle and other barbaric means of resolving conflicts of
disputes, and we must move away from the total reliance on
the adversary contests for resolving all disputes. For
some disputes, trials will be the only means, but for
many, trials by the adversary contest must in time go the
way of the ancient trial by battle and blood. Our system
is too costly, too painful, too destructive, too
inefficient for a truly civilized people. To rely on the
adversary process as the principal means of resolving
conflicting claims is a mistake that must be corrected.
The plaintive cry of many frustrated litigants echoes what
Hand said: "There must be a better way." [Ref. 6:p. 62]
There is a better way; it is called alternative means of
dispute resolution, or simply ADR. While some see ADR as
merely a "fad" and question its specific utility in Government
disputes, ADR has helped and continues to successfully help
resolve private conflicts similar to those conflicts heard by
the Boards of Contract Appeals. This thesis' main contention
is that it is time for the Department of Defense, and those
individuals who deal with it, to explore seriously the
potential uses for ADR, specifically the minitrial, and to
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begin creating an atmosphere in which these methods can be
more readily employed.
The good news is that within the Government contracts
community, a small but promising movement has begun away from
the perilous trend of red tape, procedural ism, and intolerable
delay. The bad news is that the movement is much too slow.
There is almost universal agreement amongst contractors, DoD
officials, Government attorneys, auditors, inspector generals,
and administrative judges that Government contract appeals
have become too complicated, too expensive, and altogether too
time consuming. Despite Congress' declared goals in the
Contract Disputes Act of 1978 to encourage negotiated
settlement by providing an expeditious alternative to court
litigation, appeals now are rarely resolved expeditiously or
inexpensively, in any forum.
Why then, with all the principal participants in DoD
disputes clamoring for some sort of change, did the ADR
movement that was building in the mid 1980s, slow to a trickle
in the early 1990s?
The primary reason is that contracting officers fear being
second-guessed by superiors, auditors, Congressmen, and/or the
press. This fear significantly reduces any incentive to take
sensible steps to settle a complex or controversial problem.
Not surprisingly, this uncertainty can cause some defense
contractors to prefer to appeal a decision rather than to
waste their time negotiating what could be a tenuous
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settlement. Increasingly, management problems are handed over
to lawyers and accountants to be resolved in forums hardly
designed for efficiency. Often, the criteria used are only
marginally relevant to the real issues in the dispute,
resulting in an ever increasing caseload at the Boards and
Courts . A common complaint is that the Boards themselves
,
originally created as a sort of alternative means of dispute
resolution, have become too " judicialized. " [Ref. 32:p. 89]
The burdens of traditional litigation, the very situation the
boards were created to avoid, are now virtually inevitable
because of the increased use of depositions, discovery, and
opinion writing.
What is the solution? Although the numbers are small, the
success rate for the Government utilization of the minitrial
is excellent. Of the eleven cases that have been "minitried"
by the Government, all but one settled. The potential for
success is clearly evident, however, a new mind set must take
place before any form of ADR becomes common practice.
All dispute cases potentially are appropriate for ADR or
minitrial use, except those which are clearly dependent on
legal issues. If implemented properly, the minitrial is a
useful alternative to litigation in the resolution of contract
claims disputes when: there is close factual question as to
entitlement, and there are experts who support both the
Government's and contractor's position; when agreement has
been reached as to entitlement, but the parties cannot agree
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on quantum; and when legal or technical staff presents an
overzealous assessment of the Government's position. The
minitrial can demonstrate to the contracting officer the
weaknesses, as well as the strengths, of the Government's
position. This enables the contracting officer to better
assess the merits of the claim.
To that end, the disputes claims that are most appropriate
for minitrial resolution are: differing site disputes in
which the parties disagree on the conditions of the site;
disputes arising from the agency changing the work required
under the contract; defects in contract specifications with
which the contractor finds it impossible to comply; defective
pricing audits; and disputes over construction and ship repair
contracts. [Ref. 23 :p. 4]
B. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Advocates must now focus on selling the use of ADR
techniques on an individual basis. Widespread dissemination
of information on the processes and their benefits is needed
to overcome the misconceptions and general unfamiliarity that
block their acceptance.
The full potential of the minitrial cannot be attained
without a cultural change within most contracting agencies.
Effective use of ADR means coming to grips with the dispute
before reaching a dispositive solution. To mold genuine,
enthusiastic support for ADR techniques, specifically the
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minitrial, will require specific and sustained efforts on many
fronts. Following are six recommendations for pushing ADR as
a viable alternative to litigation: [Ref. 3:p. 24]
1. Designation of "Disputes Resolution Advocates" within
agencies and large contractor organizations,
2. Stronger Federal policy statements encouraging ADR at
the contracting officer level,
3. Government contract clauses describing all ADR
possibilities
,
4. More complex and comprehensive ADR test programs,
5
.
Development of ADR training programs for both Government
and industry personnel, and
6. Evaluation of contracting officers on their
effectiveness in managing contract disputes.
To date, no compelling arguments have been made against
the use of minitrials to supplement the overworked claims
system. Prior experience in the private sector and limited
Government application have both produced attractive results.
The Government and defense contractors alike stand to benefit
from the potential of time and cost savings, and decisions
that are more tailored to the unique circumstances of each
case.
The Department of Defense should adopt policies promoting
and encouraging the use of minitrials in resolving disputes
.
The DoD policy should encourage regular review of cases for
susceptibility, with caution not to undermine the process
with excessive regulations and standardization. The policy
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should offer advice on how to document the process and justify
settlements in order to protect decision makers. Policies
should be supplemented with training and outreach efforts on
minitrials and other ADR applications. Whether these efforts
will suffice remains to be seen. However, without these kinds
of initiatives, Government contract disputes will continue to
be handled in a manner that leaves most parties dissatisfied.
Clearly, "there must be a better way."
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
As a result of this thesis, there are two possible areas
for future research. The first is to try to determine why
contracting officers are reluctant to utilize the minitrial,
or any other form of ADR, and what can be done to make
minitrials, not litigation, the desired form of dispute
resolution. Secondly, in the same vein, research is needed to
determine the reluctance of defense contractors in utilizing
the minitrial technique. This research should include
potential procedures and necessary modifications to current
instructions that would be required in order to overcome the
reluctance to ADR, and more specifically, the minitrial.
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APPENDIX A
MINI-TRIAL PROTOCOL AGREEMENT BETWEEN
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND
This Mini-Trial Protocol Agreement (the "Protocol
Agreement") , dated this day of , 19.
is executed by rNAMEl , rTITLE!
behalf of the United States of America (the "United States'




1. The United States and XY2 Corp. are
currently engaged in litigation [or are about to engage in
litigation] in the United States District Court for
2. The United States and XY2 Corp. have j
-to seek a resolution of rNAME OF CASE! Dockel




This Protocol Agreement is intended to set forth
conditions under which the parties will conduct the Mini-Ta
thereby avoiding future disputes and disagreements.
AGREEMENT
NOW, THEREFORE, subject to the terms and conditions oJ
Agreement, the parties mutually agree as follows:
1. The United States and XYZ Corp. will volunt
engage in a non-binding Mini-Trial on the issue of
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fTWTr TSSUfg MAY BE DTT.TNEATEP SPF.CTFICALLY QP gENERALLY
rflFF,T™™* ow aaOaicBE qe xbe cmei • The
Mini-Trial
will be held on « ** rTTMfi PF PAY!
[J-OeATTONT
2. The purpose of this Mini-Trial is to inform the
principal participants of the position of each party on
the
issues in the case and the underlying bases of the
parties'
positions. It is agreed that each party will have the
opportunity and responsibility to present its "best case- on
entitlement and quantum.




States and *°* XY8 COT-" '
The
principal participants have the authority to settle the dispute
or to make a recommendation concerning settlement. Each party
will present its position to the principal participants through




United States, and , for XYZ CPrp.
4. The parties have agreed that
shall serve as a Neutral Advisor to the principals. The Neutral
Advisor shall be compensated as set forth in the Financial
Agreement. The Advisor has warranted that he or she has had no
prior involvement with this dispute or litigation and has agreed
that he or she will not participate in the litigation should the
Mini-Trial fail to resolve the dispute. The Neutral Advisor
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shall participate in the Mini-Trial proceedings and shall II
an opinion, upon request, on the following issues:
TTHIS CLAUSE SHOULD BE USI
TF THE PARTTES HAVE AGREED THAT THE PARTTCTPATTON OF A NEIT1,
ADVTSOR WOULD BE USEFUL!
;
5. All discovery will be completed in twenty working
following the execution of this Protocol Agreement. Neithc
party shall propound more than 15 interrogatories or reguesi
admissions, including subparts; nor shall either party take;
than five depositions and no deposition shall last more thr
three hours. Discovery taken during the period prior to tli
Mini-Trial shall be admissible for all purposes in this
litigation to the same extent as any other discovery, inclii
any subsequent hearing before any court of competent autho:
the event this Mini-Trial does not result in a resolution II
matter.- It is agreed that the pursuit of discovery during;
period prior to the Mini-Trial shall not restrict either p;i
ability to take additional discovery at a later date. In
particular, it is understood and agreed that partial depos
may be necessary to prepare for the Mini-Trial. If this m;
is not resolved informally as a result of this procedure, ]
complete depositions of the same individuals may be necess
In that event, the partial depositions taken during this i:
period shall in no way foreclose additional depositions of




6. The presentations at the Mini-Trial will
be informal.
The rules of evidence will not apply, and
witnesses may provide
testimony in narrative form. The principal
participants may ask
any questions of the witnesses. However,
any questioning by the
principals, other than that occurring during the
period set aside
for questions, shall be charged to the time
period allowed for
that party's presentation of its case as
delineated in Paragraph
8.
7. At the Mini-Trial proceeding, the
representatives have
the discretion to structure their presentations
as desired. The
presentation may include the testimony of expert witnesses,
the
use of audio visual aids, demonstrative evidence,
depositions,
and oral argument. The parties agree that stipulations
will be
utilized to the maximum extent possible. Any complete
or partia!
depositions taken in connection with the litigation in
general,
or in contemplation of the Mini-Trial proceedings, may
be
introduced at the Mini-Trial as information to assist the
principal participants to understand the various aspects of
the
parties' respective positions. The parties may use any
type of
written material which will further the progress of the Mini-
Trial. The parties may, if desired, no later than
weeks
prior to commencement of the Mini-Trial, submit to the
representatives for the opposing side a position paper of no moi;
than 25-8 1/2" X 11" double spaced pages. No later than
weeks (s) prior to commencement of the proceedings, the parties
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will exchange copies of all documentary evidence proposed
at the Mini-Trial and a list of all witnesses.
8. The Mini-Trial proceedings shall take one day. *|
morning's proceedings shall begin at a.m. and shall &)
until a.m. The afternoon's proceedings shall begin
i
p.m. and continue until p.m. A sample sche
follows:
9:00 a.m. - 10:00 a.m.
10:00 a.m. - 11:00 a.m.
11:00 a.m. - 11:30 a.m.
11:30 a.m. - 12:00 noon
12:00 noon - 1:00 p.m.
1:00 p.m. - 2:00 p.m.
2:00 p.m. - 3:00 p.m.
3:00 p.m. - 3:30 p.m.
3:30 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.
4:00 p.m. - 4:30 p.m.
4:30 p.m. - 5:00 p.m.
9. Within




Open question and answer per:
Lunch





Open question and answer per
XYZ Corp.'s closing argument
United States' closing argum
day(s) following the termination of
Mini-Trial proceedings, the principal participants should :
or confer, as often as they shall mutually agree might be
productive for resolution of the dispute. If the parties
unable to resolve the dispute within days following
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completion of the Mini-Trial, the Mini-Trial
process shall be
deemed terminated and the litigation will
continue.
10. Ho transcript or recording shall be
made of the Mini-
Trial proceedings.' Except for discovery
undertaken in connection
with this Mini-Trial, all written material
prepared specifically
for utilization at the Mini-Trial, all
oral presentations made,
and all discussions between or among
the parties and/or the
Neutral Advisor at the Mini-Trial are
confidential to all
persons, and are inadmissible as evidence,
whether or not for
purposes of impeachment, in any pending or
future court or
administrative action which directly or indirectly
involves the
parties and the matter in dispute. However, if
settlement is
reached as aa result of the Mini-Trial, any and
all information
prepared for, and presented at the proceedings may
be used to
justify and document the subsequent settlement. Furthermore,
evidence that is otherwise admissible shall not be
rendered
inadmissible as a result of its use at the Mini-Trial.
11. Each party has the right to terminate the
Mini-Trial
process at any time for any reason whatsoever.
12. Upon execution of this Protocol Agreement, if
mutually
deemed advisable by the parties, the United States
and the
yvz com. shall file a joint motion to suspend
proceedings in the appropriate court. The motion shall
advise th




Mini-Trial. The court will be advised as to the tine schec
established for completing the Mini-Trial proceedings.
DATED: DATED :_
BY: BY:
Principal Representative for Principal Represent
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